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Friendship Otherwise - Toward a Levinasian Description of Personal 
Friendship 
 





A Levinasian reading of intimate and personal friendship - of friendship “otherwise than 
political”, as it were - suggests that intimate and personal friendship cannot be subsumed under 
either completely ethical or completely erotic terms. While friendship can be understood as a 
certain “fraternity”, and thus be legitimately employed in discussing justice and politics, such a 
usage trades on a certain equivocation. Hermeneutics seeks to make the alien familiar, and 
deconstruction seeks to show that the familiar is always (already) alien. As this paper seeks to 
describe, a Levinasian reading of personal friendship involves both of these movements. In that 
Levinas, however, never explicitly addresses this relationship, the paper proceeds by sketching the 
broad contours of his thought before offering a phenomenology of personal friendship in the wake 
of the limits Levinas thematizes in his analysis of the ethical relation. The readings and analysis 
presented suggest that personal friendship appears as an irreducible excess, reducible to neither 
ethics nor enjoyment, while nevertheless passing through ethics and enjoyment. Friendship marks 





The philosophical treatment of friendship has enjoyed 
a revival in continental philosophy as of late. This 
revival is in large part due to the influence of 
Emmanuel Levinas, who revived ethics as the proper 
topic of philosophy - as “first philosophy”. This claim 
becomes evident in surveying recent discussions of 
friendship. For instance, in Oneself as Another, Paul 
Ricoeur explicitly engages Levinas in explicating his 
own moral anthropology.1 In this work, Ricoeur 
appropriates the classical Aristotelian framework in 
constructing an ethics of “reciprocity”, of shared 
community, where friendship occurs as the mutual 
striving for the “good life”, for a certain virtue 
(Ricoeur, 1996, p. 187). Here, real community occurs 
as equal exchange - a “fragile balance in which giving 
and receiving are equal, hypothetically” (ibid., p. 
188). One’s “ethical intention” conditions moral 
sociality in the communal founding and maintenance 
of just institutions (ibid., p. 172). The “friendship” of 
autonomous “intentions”, as a reciprocity between 
“other-selves”, defines friendship and is the condition 
of possibility of just institutions.2  Jacques Derrida, in 
The Politics of Friendship (1988), attacks the priority 
of this relationship in favour of “heterology, 
asymmetry, and infinity”, taking up the Levinasian 
terminus in a plea for a politics that “answers first to 
the Other” (Derrida, 1988, pp. 632-44). Whether 
prioritizing self or other, whether a “hermeneutic” or 
“deconstructive” ethics, or whether through 
appropriating or distancing, Levinas is a point of 
reference. 
 
In this essay I seek to give a Levinasian reading of 
intimate and personal Friendship - of friendship 
“otherwise than political”. In introducing his 
phenomenology of eros, Levinas (1969, p. 253) 
writes: 
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[W]e must indicate a plane both 
presupposing and transcending the 
epiphany of the Other in the face, a plane 
where the I bears itself beyond death and 
recovers also from its return to itself. This 
plane is that of love and fecundity, where 
subjectivity is posited in function of these 
movements. 
 
Richard Cohen (1994, pp. 207-208) assesses the 
relation of these different “planes” as follows: 
 
Levinas’s sequence: ethics first, eros second, 
reveals the “beyond the face” character of 
eros itself. It is not that eros is extraneous to 
ethics, or that ethics is extraneous to eros, for 
that matter, but rather that erotic nudity 
involves a specific subversion of an 
intersubjectivity already constituted ethically. 
Erotic nudity cannot be subsumed under 
purely ethical terms. But neither can it be 
accounted for without significance already 
established through ethical encounter. 
 
I would like to suggest that intimate and personal 
friendship occurs on just such a plane. Friendship 
cannot be subsumed under completely ethical terms 
or under completely erotic or filial terms. Friendship 
can be understood as a certain “fraternity”, and thus 
be legitimately employed in discussing justice and 
politics. Such a usage, however, trades on a certain 
equivocation. Hermeneutics seeks to make the alien 
familiar, and deconstruction seeks to show that the 
familiar is always (already) alien. As I will seek to 
describe, a Levinasian reading of personal friendship 
involves both of these movements. In that Levinas 
never explicitly addresses this relation, I will begin by 
sketching the broad contours of his thought. I will 
then offer a phenomenology of personal friendship in 
the wake of the limits Levinas thematizes in his 
analysis of the ethical relation. My readings and 
analysis will suggest that personal friendship appears 
as an irreducible excess, reducible to neither ethics 
nor enjoyment, while nevertheless passing through 
ethics and enjoyment. Friendship marks a space of 
non-violent familiarity and exteriority, a site of 
solidarity between identity and difference. It should 
be noted that my intent is not so much to elaborate a 
philosophy of friendship as such, but to describe how 
the phenomenon of personal friendship discloses the 
possibility of a non-violent or non-coercive relation 
between identity and otherness (or alterity).  
 
The Ethical Relation 
 
1.   Levinas’s Concern 
In Levinas’s two major and classic works, Totality 
and Infinity (1969) and Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence (1981/1997), he seeks to offer an 
account of subjectivity and alterity without reducing 
either to a third term. The philosophical tradition has 
always sought to reconcile the same and the other in a 
relation that renders separate and different terms 
comprehensible. The consequence of this movement 
is that the third term ends up evaporating the 
uniqueness of the terms it seeks to explain. In pre-
Kantian metaphysics, this took the form of 
elaborating the eternal metaphysical structure of the 
real, the structure that grants stable identity to entities 
that change across time. In modern philosophy, the 
emphasis shifted to epistemic justification and 
methodological purity, but the goal of articulating the 
stable structures necessary to explain identity and 
difference maintained its primacy. In contemporary 
philosophy, the quest for certain and absolute 
knowledge has largely been abandoned. Yet, even 
here, the primacy of the third term over the terms it 
purports to explain maintains itself. Whether Hegel’s 
Geist or Heidegger’s Being, singular entities become 
dependent on and subordinate to a third term. In 
Hegel, for example, individuals are moments in the 
procession of a single and universal subject coming to 
know itself as history. In Heidegger, Dasein is a site 
where Being reveals and conceals itself, opening 
singular entities to the possibilities of their historical 
destiny. Despite some radical differences in their 
respective positions, Hegel and Heidegger both locate 
singular entities in a drama that privileges the 
knowing or aesthetic relation. This move ends in 
subordinating the importance of singular and unique 
entities to a general term or relation that can, as 
history testifies, offer a justification for violence and 
oppression.  It is this violence and oppression - the 
coercion of the third term - which Levinas contests. I 
will now review how Levinas seeks to describe inter-
subjective relation in a way that avoids subsuming the 
same and the other into the third. 
 
2.   Separation of the Self 
For Levinas, the self crystallizes in enjoyment 
[jouissance]. We do not experience good food as a 
Cartesian idea. The food we eat, the air we breathe, 
the light, the warmth and illumines are not 
experienced as causal necessities for bare subsistence. 
These qualitative elements are first of all objects of 
taste, first of all enjoyed or suffered. The happiness 
achieved in enjoyment liberates the self; in this 
happiness the self achieves independence. This 
freedom, however, is dependent upon content - the 
joy or pain of eating, looking, breathing, and so forth. 
The very advent of the self in enjoyment shows that 
the freedom achieved in separation is happily 
dependent on the world. The self is not posited as a 
hypothesis somehow “behind” experience; it forms in 
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enjoyment. Though we no doubt experience need and 
dissatisfaction, this suffering is dependent upon and 
anticipates the happiness of enjoyment. This 
anticipation discloses interiority as the site from 
which I live. The space of enjoyment is the place we 
call home, the place of habitation. 
 
The home is not first of all experienced as 
“equipment.” Home is an “inside space” to which I 
retire after work and thus can be interpreted as an 
“implement”, much as the hammer or pen is an 
implement. The home protects me from rain and sleet. 
Yet home is not an end in the ultimate sense; it is the 
beginning. The privileged place of home is that it is 
the condition of possibility for life and action. We 
engage the world and live life out of a home, out of 
interiority. We do not “constitute” objects a priori, we 
recognize home as having dwelt in it as concrete 
being. In other words, we are only able to represent or 
conceptualize home as an implement by the already 
concrete experience of dwelling, and this dwelling 
marks the interiority produced in enjoyment. Thus, 
thinking about the world presupposes dwelling, the 
separation of the self from the elements and the 
recollection of the elements in the intimacy of the 
home. This recollection “designates a suspension of 
immediate reactions the world solicits in view of a 
greater attention to oneself, one’s possibilities, and 
situation” (Levinas, 1969, p. 154). Recollection 
produces distance between me and that which I recall. 
 
In recollecting sensible enjoyment in separation, the 
self discovers that the intimacy of dwelling 
presupposes the other. Levinas writes that 
“Recollection … no longer deriv[es] its freedom from 
the agreeableness of the elements, … the intimacy 
which familiarity presupposes is an intimacy with 
someone” (ibid., p. 155). The familiarity with this 
someone does not obliterate the separation the self 
achieves in enjoyment. This intimacy occurs as an 
intimate hospitality, a welcome whose presence is 
achieved in withdrawal and absence. He calls this 
“field of intimacy” the feminine. This welcoming 
intimacy cannot be represented in terms of usability. 
The feminine is not yet language as such, but “an 
expression in a secret”. The separation and distance 
that is made concrete through this intimacy discloses 
new relations with elements. 
 
The distance disclosed in the intimacy of home makes 
labour, possession, and representation possible. Here, 
immediate enjoyment is delayed without obliterating 
the original relation. Labour draws things from the 
elements and thus discovers the world. The home 
transforms the self’s relation to the elements. Here the 
self breaks with natural existence in the sense that “it 
has a street front” but also its secrecy, its interiority. 
Yet, Levinas (ibid., p. 117) writes: 
 
Labour … already requires discourse and 
consequently the height of the other 
irreducible to the same, the presence of 
the Other. … already [the self] leaves 
pure nature by virtue of the human body 
raised upwards, committed in the 
direction of height. This is not an 
empirical illusion but its ontological 
production and its ineffaceable testimony. 
[original emphasis]  
 
Labour presupposes what Levinas calls “the face”. 
 
3.   The “Face”: the Ethical Relation 
After having described how the self as sensible being 
achieves separation, Levinas turns to describing how 
the self concretely encounters another person. While 
my sense of self is constituted in enjoyment, when I 
face another person, I encounter a certain resistance. 
The other is somehow different from me. The way I 
experience the other is also very different from the 
way I experience the qualitative elements. This 
radical difference is manifest in the other’s face. 
When I encounter the face of another, it refuses to be 
encompassed by my own ideas and tastes, by my own 
intentional experience. The face presents itself as 
refusing to be made present. I cannot exhaust or 
encompass the uniqueness and otherness of the other 
through analogy to another image, or even by 
reference to what she says. When the other speaks to 
me, she absolves herself from the theme she presents. 
My encounter with the face opens upon the infinite. 
The other is never reducible to the ideas and concepts 
we employ to communicate. The other is transcendent 
and alien to my experience, never utterly 
comprehended or subsumed by my experience. 
Rather than construing this difference in terms of 
absurdity or any type of mystical encounter, Levinas 
designates this non-comprehension as ethical. 
 
The face resists my powers of possession, whether in 
terms of enjoyment or knowledge. This resistance 
occurs when the other speaks to me. The theme she 
presents in conversation retains a trace of this 
transcendent alterity; that is to say, when the other 
speaks, she says, “you shall not commit murder”. 
This command designates the height of the other, as 
she is irreducible to my intentional experience. This 
command, the height of the other, precisely appears in 
her destitution. Rather than occurring under threat 
from on high, the height of the other appears through 
the nudity and destitution of the defenseless. The 
other who commands from on high is none other than 
the widow, orphan, and beggar, the stranger who 
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needs assistance, the naked who needs clothing. This 
is what makes the face so uncanny. It presents the 
unpresentable, it is the presence of that which is 
always absent from me, and it is the resistance of that 
which has no resistance: the ethical resistance of the 
hungry and orphaned. It is this very distance and 
respect established by the epiphany of the face that 
objectivity and justice presuppose.   
  
As noted, Levinas does not advocate an absurdist or 
mystical sense of non-comprehension. These 
positions efface the alterity of the other in a way very 
similar to that of traditional metaphysics: evaporating 
the self and/or other into each other, into a context, or 
rendering them illusory in the ubiquitous break-up of 
context. The non-comprehension in the ethical 
relation, the distance and respect it establishes, 
informs the work of justice and knowledge. Ethics 
informs knowledge of the self’s expropriation, 
bringing in the question of justice. Levinas describes 
this as occurring with the entrance of a third person, 
another other with whom I am an equal in 
responsibility. Here, I realize that, if I utterly divest 
myself before the face of the other, I have nothing left 
to give the other other. Hence, economy, being, 
reciprocity - all the central terms of western 
Metaphysics - become important. The movement of 
consciousness is, then, conditioned upon the 
separation of the self, its infinite responsibility before 
the face, and the work of justice which requires 
measurement and reciprocity.  
 
When the third person enters the drama of ethics, this 
person in a sense “corrects” the incessant height, the 
asymmetry, in which the face is looked at. The height 
and command of the other, in relation to the third 
party, discloses that I am even responsible for myself. 
Yet this self-responsibility can only surface in that, 
with the entrance of the third person, I am even 
responsible for the other’s responsibility!  Levinas 
employs words such as “obsession”, “trauma” and 
“disturbance” to describe affectively how this 
unlimited responsibility is inscribed:  
 
In the proximity of the other, all the others 
than the other obsess me, and already this 
obsession cries out for justice, demands 
measure and knowing, is consciousness. … 
The neighbour who obsesses me is already 
a face, both comparable and incomparable, 
a unique face and in relationship with faces, 
which are visible in the concern for justice. 
(Levinas, 1981/1997, p. 158)  
 
The disturbance and “obsession” the other engenders 
recalls the jouissance, the affective participation, in 
which the self is separate as sensible being. 
Affectivity includes suffering as well as enjoyment. 
With the event of the face, the entrance of the third 
person, and the unlimited responsibility she 
engenders, the primordial sense that is given in all 
sense, prior to representation, is shown to be that the 
self is irrecusably for the other; all sense retains a 
trace of the ethical. Levinas calls this relation 
“substitution”. Sensibility’s signifyingness is “… the 
one-for-the-other itself - the pre-original signifying- 
ness that gives sense, because it gives” (ibid., p. 78). 
In the one-for-the-other, the self “substitutes” itself 
for the other as “responsibility for the responsibility 
for the other”. 
  
Substitution operates in every communicative 
expression. As noted above, when the face speaks, it 
refuses to be absorbed into the theme. Levinas 
deepens this account by explaining that the “saying” 
of the other is what retains a trace of this radical, 
unlimited responsibility. What is “said” by the other, 
the content of her expression, is already the domain of 
representation and the conscious, intentional subject, 
already subject to verification, measurement, and so 
forth. With the other’s saying, however, passes a trace 
of the disturbing and irrecusable responsibility that is 
the condition for separation and respect. Though the 
self is always separate and unique in its separation in 
sensible enjoyment, the event of the face and its 
expression is shown to have always already opened 
the self to the other. Sensibility is still the 
fundamental region of this drama. The vulnerability 
the self experiences allows it to give to the other - 
even the bread from its very mouth. This vulnerability 
illumines a deeper sense of separation and 
uniqueness. The self is irreplaceable in its unlimited 
responsibility, in that “[no] one can substitute himself 
for me, who substitutes myself for all” (ibid., p. 126).  
 
Levinas’s descriptions seem to be very excessive. The 
emphasis on unlimited responsibility, an ethics that 
refuses to evaporate in representation or ontology, 
requires such excess. Responsibility is unlimited, 
infinite, and prior to the mastery of intentional 
consciousness. Yet, in my responsibility, the other is 
proximate even in her height and distance. Levinas 
(ibid., p. 124) writes: 
 
[T]he proximity of the neighbour in its 
trauma does not only strike up against 
me, but exalts and elevates me, and, in 
the literal sense of the term, inspires me. 
Inspiration, heteronomy, is the very 
pneuma of the psyche. … Substitution 
frees the subject … from the enchainment 
to itself … . 
 
To use the language of TI, the self is free in its 
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dependence. This inscription occurs too in infinite 
responsibility, rendering the self’s freedom finite yet 
infinitely meaningful. In its traditional treatment, 
freedom is either reduced to the arbitrary or to a node 
in a system. Freedom then becomes a calculation of 
rights, and this calculation defines “justice”. Levinas 
asserts that “Freedom in the genuine sense can be 
only a contestation of this book-keeping by a 
gratuity” (ibid., p. 125).  Freedom is in giving deeply, 
gratuitously, apart from a calculation between two 
“freedoms”.  Finite freedom is not only gratuity, but 
the “inspiration, heteronomy, … the very pneuma of 
the psyche”. In this trauma, the Good “reabsorbs, or 
redeems, the violence of non-freedom” (ibid., p. 123) 
- a purchase, in effect, in which the Good buys back 
economy as such. This buying back, this redemption, 
enables one to “catch sight of and conceive value” 
(ibid., p. 154). The trauma of the other not only 
wounds, but elevates, exalts in pathos and inspiration; 
a subjection and elevation “… in allegiance to the 
Good” (ibid., p. 126). Thus, the unconditional 
responsibility for-the-other is a modality of freedom. 
In the work of justice, which is the very task of 
consciousness, “my responsibility for all can and has 
to manifest itself also in limiting itself [and] … in the 
name of unlimited responsibility, be called to concern 
itself with itself” (ibid., p. 128). 
  
4.   Summation 
Levinas gives us a novel and interesting account of 
intersubjectivity. The self forms in its affective 
participation in the world. As the sediments of this 
participation are unearthed, the other person is shown 
to be the condition for this happy and suffered 
participation. The other opens the self in inscribing it 
with an unlimited responsibility. This responsibility 
introduces meaning into being while rendering being 
subordinate to and exceeded by the ethical relation. 
The responsibility inscribed in this relation, the 
height, distance, and destitution of the other, are 
conditions for the objectivity sought in knowledge 
and justice. 
  
As noted above, friendship involves a certain sense of 
“fraternity”, and thus can be useful in discussing 
justice and politics. As we have seen, however, 
politics and justice are dependent upon a more 
fundamental drama between the happy self and the 
enigmatic other. Personal and intimate friendship 
would represent a type of intermediate region 
between the ethical drama and the task of justice that 
is, as noted, the movement of consciousness. Here I 
will seek to describe this relation, in the wake of the 
ethical relation as Levinas describes it. I will show 
that personal friendship appears as an excess 
reducible to neither ethics nor enjoyment, while 
nevertheless passing through ethics and enjoyment. 
Friendship marks a space of non-violent familiarity 




Phenomenology of Friendship 
‘Friendship’ marks a region in the task of justice, that 
is to say, marks a space of conscious relation. This 
does not render ‘friendship’ a ruse of intentional 
consciousness. As with eros, friendship takes-place 
“beyond the face”, that is “outside” or otherwise than 
the straightforwardness of the face, without effacing 
the face. ‘Friendship’ is a trope that traces a certain 
“taking-place” as it occurs in inter-subjective relation. 
Yet its taking-place speaks of an anterior occurrence, 
a past, a memory, a recollection: the recollection of 
home in the separation of self. ‘Friendship’ brings to 
mind that “gentleness of being” that accomplishes 
habitation as the “site the I acts from” and from which 
it “commences”.  It recollects that “personal and 
intimate alterity” that is the condition of possibility 
for labour and representation, themselves the 
conditions of the task of justice. Thus, in ‘friendship’, 
the other is beyond welcome in my home. My friend 
re-minds me, incites a recollection of self as separated 
being. My friend, as a “personal alterity” with whom 
I have intimacy and a sense of familiarity, graces 
interiority. The friend re-minds me that enjoyment is 
a “… grace of life”, and only is violent in un-
attendance to the other. The friend is a “resident 
alien” in my home - my house is his house in a way 
more intimate than the hospitality due to the stranger. 
The friend, the best friend, is told where the pantry is 
located - told with a smile, “go get it yourself”. 
 
The taking place of ‘friendship’ exceeds recollection 
as such. The Friend, while inciting a recollection of 
the intimacy of home, concretely repeats the event of 
the face. Thus the Friend reasserts her irreducibility to 
the play of the same even as she enjoys the welcome 
of residence, not merely as a guest, but as a luxury, an 
“honour”, an “honorary member” of my house. The 
Friend is apart from my home and a-part of my home. 
It must be stressed that the Friend is not a function in 
a dialectic nor assimilable in a third term. The friend 
is not assimilable as “other-self”, the conjunction of 
autonomous “virtues”, a difference of mere degree. 
The Friend is the other otherwise, the other-beyond-
welcome, who is a part of my home, yet is served by 
my house. An intimacy that is neither required for 
ethics, nor required for the separation of the same - a 
gift, a luxury, a pure grace. Here I will examine this 
gifting more closely. 
 
The Friend brings to remembrance separation and 
concretely repeats the event of the face. Yet the 
occurrence of friendship - the event of the Friend - 
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takes-place as a gifting. The Friend, as other, moves-
toward-me - as if he’s descending from his height, yet 
always remaining in height. The Friend, as other, 
moves-toward-me - as if arising from destitution, yet 
always a stranger, always naked and poor. The vector 
of his movement, as movement-toward-me, takes-
place, and in so doing takes-space. The Friend 
discloses distance in drawing close to me. My friend 
takes-space in my dwelling as a luxury of rest, a 
friendly visit, the friend stops-by, Just-passes-
through. This taking-place occurs at the other’s 
invitation: the other invites me to be at home in my 
dwelling, that is, to sit and enjoy-with him, to enjoy 
his company. 
  
Home is the site where I give, attend the other, cover 
their nudity, and so forth. The Friend invites me to 
receive his or her hospitality as the Friend, to rest in 
my very own dwelling. This is the very ‘intimacy’ of 
friendship: the Face to whom I am infinitely 
responsible identifies with me as responsible; this 
identification, as a Just-passing-through, appears as a 
descent and ascent, a gratuity that neither ameliorates 
the primacy of ethics nor reduces the other to the 
same. This movement-toward-me, this descent and 
ascent occurs as a simple “after you, Sir” directed at 
me. Yet, beyond this ‘vous’, the Friend addresses me 
as ‘tu’. Not as payment or “return”, not because they 
have to, but because they somehow enjoy my 
company.  
 
Receiving this gratuity does not alter my 
responsibility and is posterior to the separation of 
self. It concretely recollects separation and concretely 
repeats the event of the face: a simultaneity that 
occurs as a ‘present’, a gifting that de-phases ‘self-
presence’. In this simultaneity, enjoyment and ethics 
occur as a said that says ‘tu’. The contemporaneity of 
a said as ‘tu’ and saying creates an ambiguous space 
distinctive for its indeterminability: if I determine this 
taking-place as home, home pure and simple, I reduce 
the other to a commodity in my economy; if I 
determine this taking-space as the face, the face pure 
and simple, I deny-the-other an activity, a movement 
that invites a response, a response that I may refuse or 
accept.  
 
This invitation is not ethical in the sense that I can 
refuse or accept responsibility, for responsibility is 
before any activity of the I. This invitation invites me 
to be acknowledged as ‘tu’. This acknowledgement 
does not ‘accomplish’ or ‘constitute’ a freedom; 
freedom is already accomplished in responsibility (the 
I is free as created and irrecusably responsible). This 
acknowledgement receives the other as taking-place 
in my home, taking-space in my home. As I receive 
the ‘tu’, the Friend is an other-beyond-welcome, 
beyond-being-as-welcome in my home. My friend is 
apart from my home, and a part of my home. He is 
apart in being a-part, that is, within yet beyond, in 
relation while separate. And this invitation addressed 
to me is a grace, a specific Just-passing-through, a 
gift that cannot be “produced”, only received or 
refused. This choice is beyond ethics, beyond the 
face, it cannot negate or affirm ethics, it is 
ambiguously in-between, a pure excess that is an 
indeterminable space, and determined as 
indeterminability. Receiving, as an activity, is 
conditioned upon responsibility: I can only have the 
Friend through the face, through moral responsibility. 
Yet, beyond this responsibility, I may receive or 
refuse the other’s ‘tu’. Any move to determine my 
friend, encompass him in either enjoyment or ethics 
reduces the relation to an economy, that is, bestows a 
“use” upon it. My friend is enjoyed, I am responsible 
to and for him, and yet he relates to me in a way 
irreducible to both (and thus indeterminable). As a 
movement-toward-me, this activity of taking-place 
constitutes a non-extensive space, an ‘alien-intimacy’. 
My friend is apart from my house such that he is a-
part, yet in his a-partness he offers and invites, that is, 
descends and ascends. His invitation offers a 
‘friendship’ of enjoyment and ethics. He invites me to 
receive, in all my opulence, even me! He invites me 
to rest in my very house. He offers me hospitality in 
his very height and destitution. He speaks to me, he 
says ‘tu’. This pure excess is the ambiguous mixture 
of enjoyment and responsibility that refuses a 
determinate structure. The distinctive character of 
‘friendship’, intimate friendship, is its uselessness, a 
pure gift in its indeterminability, in its weird 
admixture of enjoyment and ethics.  
 
It must be stressed that this is not a dialectical or 
ontological participation. The non-reciprocal 
“reciprocity” is (hyperbolically) contingent upon a 
movement of incommensurable terms, beyond yet 
through the drama of ethics. The other moves toward 
me in saying ‘tu’, even as I address them as ‘vous’, as 
if they descend from their height, as if they ascend as 
destitute. In my absolute responsibility, in my respect 
and attendance to the other, my friend invites me to 
be attended, treats me as a height. This movement of 
the other occurs as a gift, in that it is extraneous to the 
responsibility of ethics and the intimacy of eros. It is 
a non-extensive space, a taking-place that is 
conditioned upon the ‘activity’ of my reception. For 
the friend to be my friend I must receive him beyond 
receiving him in my home, a receiving as my home, 
as apart from my house in his a-partness.  
 
The Friend, when his invitation is taken up, becomes 
my friend. My enjoyment of this intimacy induces 
wonder in that the me and my I utter in saying “my 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 5, Edition 2 December 2005  Page 7 of 8 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
friend”, in saying “me?” to his invitation, recalls the 
trauma of exposure.  In receiving the Friend, the self 
is dis-rupted all over again: obsessed, traumatized, 
and hostage. The my of friendship recalls the my of 
substitution. This “exalts and elevates” the very self 
in the wonder that my friend, who is the other to 
whom I am infinitely responsible, enjoys me.  
 
This does not level the asymmetrical space, the height 
and destitution of the other. In my wonderment, I 
ascend, am lifted up in pathos, even as my friend 
descends and says ‘tu’, invites me to enjoy-with. In 
my shame, in my obsessive and traumatic 
responsibility, I descend to attend to the destitution of 
the other, to cover his nakedness, even as my friend 
ascends and says ‘tu’, identifies with-me as 
responsible. This identification is non-ontological, it 
is an ethical identification. As such it is an 
unstipulated grace, a mystery. This movement-
toward-me of the other and my exultation and shame 
do not result in a “linking up” or “fusion” between me 
and my friend. The vector of our movements occurs 
as a passing, a Just-passing-through.  Not a passing 
through as “mystic union”, a Just-passing-through the 
non-extensive space that occurs as a taking-place of 
my friend as a-part of my home; initiated by the other 
and not a condition for either selfhood or ethics, a 
pure and excessive gift. To speak in ontological 
terms, this passing is a “happy accident”. It is not 
“necessary”, in that it is unnecessary to ethics, the 
advent of self, and the task of justice (thus its 
“uselessness”). Friendship is contingent upon the 
grace of my friend’s descent from height and ascent 
in destitution; is contingent upon my ascent in 
attending to the imperative of his height and the 
pathos of elevation; and contingent upon my descent 
in attending his destitution and nudity. The Just-
passing-through of these movements is an “accidental 
reciprocity”. The purity of this excess is precisely in 
its impurity, the ambiguous indeterminability of a 
simultaneity of ethics and enjoyment in a non-
extensive space. In this “accidental” Just-passing-
through of me and my friend passes a trace of a 
‘friendship’ of ethics and enjoyment. 
 
‘Friendship,’ the Friend, my friend is a good-gift, a 
gift of the Good, a smile in the work of justice. In this 
‘beautiful trauma’ I undergo a “subjection and 
exultation” that speaks of my freedom in 
responsibility. The other’s movement-toward-me 
invites an activity-of-reception. This activity is 
posterior to the advent of consciousness and thus does 
not efface my infinite responsibility. This invitation 
invites me to a relation that contests calculation and 
yet is conditioned upon my reception. (“Freedom in 
the genuine sense can be only a contestation of this 
book-keeping by a gratuity” [ibid., p. 125].) The 
gratuity with which I give the bread from my mouth, 
in ‘friendship’, occurs as a gratuity directed at me, 
even me! This gift is not a return or else it would 
establish an economy. This gift is unconditioned, a 
good-gift, a gift of the Good. It is extraneous to my 
responsibility or to the accomplishment of the self (I 
am always and ineffaceably singular and responsible, 
singular as responsible in the one-for-the-other). The 
“inspiration, heteronomy, … the very pneuma of the 
psyche”, in this trauma of the Good “reabsorbs, or 
redeems, the violence of non-freedom” (ibid., p. 123). 
My friend reminds me that the Good buys back 
economy. In friendship, me and my friend repeat a 
tracing of ‘friendship’ between ethics and enjoyment, 
an ambiguous Just-passing-through of freedom and 
responsibility. Redemption, the Good, is the condition 
of possibility of the ‘friendship’, the Friend, my 
friend. 
 
My friend is hope in the task of justice, hope for a 
justice to come: the trace of ‘friendship’ between 
ethics and enjoyment, of freedom and responsibility. 
My friend occurs as a luxurious Just-passing-through, 
a non-extensive space of taking-place and the 
reception of this intimate yet indeterminable gift 
with-in yet beyond-welcome in my home. My friend 
is a consolation of the Good, a smile that refuses 
totalization or any abjection of responsibility. My 
friend is a gift! She is ‘best’, my best-friend, 
signifying the infinite height of the Good, a good-gift 
that is the best of the Good, my friend, my very best-
friend! Unspoken and unspeakable as 
indeterminability, yet read as a passing through, a 
trace of ‘friendship’ otherwise than political, a grace 
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